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Options can thus help a synergy buyer reduce the exposure problem she faces. She still
has to pay the option price, but if she fails to complete her desired bundle, then she does not
have to pay the exercise price as well and thus she limits her loss. So part of the uncertainty
of not winning subsequent auctions is transferred to the seller, who may now miss out on
the exercise price if the buyer fails to acquire the desired bundle. At the same time, the
seller can also beneﬁt indirectly, from the participation in the market by additional synergy
buyers, who would have otherwise stayed out, because they faced a high risk of exposure
to a potential loss.
1.2 Related work
In existing multi-agent literature, to our knowledge, there has been only limited work to
study the use of options to address the exposure problem.
The ﬁrst work to introduce an explicit option-based mechanism for sequential-auction
allocation of goods to the multi-agent systems (MAS) community was by Juda & Parkes
[Juda and Parkes 2009]. They create a market design in which synergy buyers are awarded
free (i.e. zero-priced) options, in order to cover their exposure problem and, for this set-
ting, they show that truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this case model, the exposure
problem is entirely solved for the synergy buyers, because they do not even have a possible
loss consisting of the option price. Having a dominant bidding strategy for the buyers is
a crucial property from a game-theoretic perspective, although in practice most real-life
online markets do not exhibit this property.
However, the mechanism proposed by Juda & Parkes relies on some assumptions that
could limit its applicability in some real-life markets. In particular, market entry effects
may not always be sufﬁcient to motivate the sellers of the items to use options. Because
the options are designed to be offered freely (zero-priced), there are cases in which sellers
do not have a sufﬁcient incentive to offer free options, because of the risk of remaining
with their items unsold. The sellers could, however, demand a premium (in the form of the
option price) to cover their risk. In such cases, only positively-priced options can provide
sufﬁcient incentive for both sides of the market (buyers and sellers) to prefer an options
mechanism over direct auctions. Moreover, while their mechanism guarantees that truth
telling is a dominant strategy for the buyers, this property may come at a loss of efﬁciency
for some settings, and sellers are assumed to be willing to wait in the market (and get their
payments marked downwards) until the buyers of their options leave.
Pricedoptionshavealonghistoryofresearchinﬁnance(see[Hull2003]foranoverview).
However, the underlying assumption for all ﬁnancial option pricing models is their depen-
dence on an underlying asset, which has a current, public value that moves independently
of the actions of individual agents (e.g. this motion is assumed to be Brownian for Black-
Scholes models). This type of assumption does not hold for the online, sequential auctions
setting we consider.
Another line of research in the business literature focuses on real options [Amram and
Kulatilaka 1998; Smith and McCardle 1999], which do not rely on the price of an underly-
ing, publicly traded asset. Most of the literature on real options we are aware of focuses on
modeling long-term business investment decisions.A relevant work that studies the use of
options in online auctions is [Gopal et al. 2005]. They discuss the beneﬁts of using options
to increase the expected revenue of a seller of multiple copies of the same good. In [Gopal
et al. 2005], however, it is the seller that ﬁxes both the option price and the exercise price
when writing the option, which requires rather strong assumptions on the knowledge of the
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seller and on the behaviour of the bidders.
There is also a connection between options and leveled commitment mechanisms [Sand-
holm and Lesser 2002; 2001; ’t Hoen et al. 2005]. In the leveled commitment mechanism
proposed by Sandholm and Lesser, both parties have the possibility to decommit (i.e. uni-
laterally break a contract), against paying a pre-agreed decommitment penalty. However,
as [Sandholm and Lesser 2002] show, setting the level of the decommitment penalty can be
hard, due to the complex game-theoretic reasoning required. There are situations in which
both parties would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to decommit but neither does, hoping the other party
would do so ﬁrst, in order to avoid paying the decommitment penalty. This differs from
option contracts, where the right to exercise the option is paid by one party in advance. In
our model, this right is sold through an auction, thus the option price is established through
an open market.
An alternative direction of research that aims to tackle a similar challenge is online
mechanism design [Friedman and Parkes 2003; Parkes 2007; Gerding et al. 2011; Robu
et al. 2011]. However, the online mechanism design literature we are aware of is mainly
concerned with the problem of declaring truthful entry and exit times in a market, and does
not deal with complementary valuations or bidder exposure to risk.
Finally, recent work by Robu, Vetsikas, Gerding & Jennings [Robu et al. 2010a; 2010b]
(which appeared after the publication of our initial paper [Mous et al. 2010]) starts from
the priced options mechanism developed in this work, and proposes a more complex and
ﬂexible model for pricing options. The starting assumptions considered by the two lines
of work are somewhat different, because this work considers a model with ﬁrst priced
options and hidden reservation values (following the transportation logistics business case
that initially motivated the work), while Robu, Vetsikas, Gerding & Jennings consider a
model with a sequence of complementary second-price auctions and no reservations. We
refer interested readers to [Robu et al. 2010a; 2010b] for a detailed comparison of the two
approaches.
1.3 Outline and contribution of our approach
The goal of this paper is to study the use of priced options to solve the exposure problem
and to identify the settings in which using priced options beneﬁts both the synergy buyer
and the seller.
An option contract speciﬁes two prices, so an adjustment needs to be made to the stan-
dard auction with bids of a single price. In this study, in order to make the analysis
tractable, we have a ﬁxed exercise price and a ﬂexible option price. The basic way our
mechanism works is that the seller determines the exercise price of an option for the good
she has for sale and then sells this option through a ﬁrst-price auction. Buyers bid for the
right to buy this option, i.e. they bid on the option price. We note that this mechanism has
the attractive property that direct auctioning of the items appears as a special case. If the
seller ﬁxes the future exercise price for the option at zero, then a buyer actually bids for
the right to get the item for free. Since such an option is always exercised (assuming free
disposal), this is basically equivalent to direct auctioning of the item itself. 8
8An alternative would be to let the sellers ﬁx the option prices, and the exercise prices be determined by the
market. A potential downside of such a mechanism may be that, if the option price is set too low, bidders could
hoard options without any intention of exercising them, just to block other bidders from competing in future
auctions.
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Based on the above description, we provide both an analytical and an experimental in-
vestigation of the setting. Our analysis of the problem can be characterized as decision-
theoretic, meaning both buyer and seller reason with respect to expected future prices.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to a decision theoretic approach. The dis-
advantage is that, unlike the existing game-theoretic approach to options [Juda and Parkes
2009] or related online mechanism design approaches [Parkes 2007], one cannot guaran-
tee that bidders have a dominant bidding strategy. On the other hand, using a mechanism
design approach often requires additional assumptions, such as the assumption in Juda &
Parkes that sellers would be interested to provide options, in order to keep buyers truthful.
Unlike such approaches, decision-theory tries to model directly the reasoning and bidding
behaviour of agents acting in real life markets (in most real-life sequential auction mar-
kets, no dominant bidding strategy exists anyway). While forgoing some of the strong,
game theoretic rationality concepts, this has the advantage that it makes the analysis com-
putationally tractable for larger settings.
To summarize, our contribution to the literature can be characterized as twofold:
First, we consider a setting in which n goods (or options for them) are auctioned se-
quentially. In our setting, there is one synergy bidder with a complementary valuation over
these goods, the rest of the competition being formed by local bidders desiring only one
good. For this setting, we show analytically (under some assumptions) when using priced
options can increase the expected proﬁt for both the synergy buyer and the sellers, com-
pared to the case when the goods are auctioned directly. In order to provide a rigorous
formal characterization of these settings, we derive the equations that provide minimum
and maximum bounds between which the bids of the synergy buyer are expected to fall, in
order for both sides to have an incentive to use options.
In the second part of the paper, we consider market settings in which multiple synergy
buyers (global bidders) are active simultaneously, and study it through experimental sim-
ulations. In such settings, we show that, while some synergy buyers loose because of the
extra competition, other synergy buyers may actually beneﬁt, because sellers are forced to
ﬁx exercise prices for options at levels which encourages participation of all buyers.
We note also that, while both parts of the paper study decision theoretic bidding be-
haviour, we consider different levels of information about the future available to the syn-
ergy bidder. In the analytical case, the exact order of the auctions is assumed to be known,
and we consider a bidder that wants a bundle of all the items to be auctioned. In the ex-
perimental part, where the synergy bidder wants only a sub-bundle of the goods from a
potentially large sequence, we assume that bidding agents know only the number of future
buying opportunities for an item of each type, not their exact order. This is actually more
realistic for the application scenarios we consider. For example, when bidding to acquire a
part-truck order in transportation logistics, it is more realistic to assume that a carrier can
approximate the number of future opportunities to buy a complementary load, but not the
exact auction order in which future loads will be offered for auction.
The structure for the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 lays the foundation for
further analysis by deriving the expected proﬁts of synergy buyers and sellers for both the
direct sale, respectively for a sale with options and clariﬁes some of the assumptions used
in our model. Section 3 provides the analytical results and proofs of the paper, for a market
of sequential auctions with one synergy buyer. Sections 4 and 5 present the results from
our experimental study, while Section 6 concludes with a discussion.
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of the ﬁrst-price auction format, bt is also the price the synergy buyer has to pay if she
wins the auction. Throughout this analysis, we assume the competition the synergy buyer
faces for each good Gt (sold at time t) is formed by local bidders that desire only the
good Gt. We further assume that these local bidders do not consider the bids placed by
the synergy buyer in their bidding. Therefore, from the perspective of the synergy bidder,
the competition can be modeled as a distribution over the expected closing prices at each
time point t, more precisely as a distribution over a value bt,maxl, which is the maximal
bid placed by the competition not counting bt.
An important part of the reasoning of the synergy buyer’s strategy, in our model, is the
availability, for each auction held at time t, of a probability distribution Ft(bt), which gives
the buyer her probability of winning the item sold at time t by placing bid bt in that auction.
Thereareseveralwaysinwhich, inarealisticscenario, thesynergybuyercouldacquirethis
information. First, it may be that the synergy buyer knows, for each auction, the number
of local bidders she is competing against, and has a distribution over their valuations. In
such a case, it would be easy to aggregate this local competition in a single probability
distribution function, that returns the probability of winning, given a bid. More generally,
however, this distribution could be learned from repeated interactions/participation in the
market, and may not necessarily require knowledge about the number of competitors in
each auction.
We can exemplify this type of probabilistic reasoning in a realistic application scenario,
which initially motivated this theoretical work - distributed transportation logistics [Robu
et al. 2008; Robu et al. 2011]. In such a market, carriers (i.e. companies owning the actual
trucks) have to bid in request for quotes auctions10. A logistic planner (representing a
carrier), knows what an order from Amsterdam to London costs to execute, on average,
given the market conditions on a given day. If she bids an amount bt, she can estimate the
probability of being awarded that order. Note that, in this case, she may not know exactly
which other carrier companies are present in the market, but from her experience she can
estimate her chances of winning the order by placing a certain bid.
2.2 Hidden reservation values
For each good Gt, there exists a strictly positive reservation value of bt,res, which is the
seller’s own valuation for that good, or, alternatively, it can be seen as a resale value if she
fails to sell the good in the current auction. To explain, in many real sequential auction
markets where options can be applied, sellers have the option of trying to resell their goods
later, even if the expected revenue of selling later is less than the expected revenue from
selling now. For instance, someone who can’t sell his/her computer monitor or bike frame
on Ebay today will try again in the future, although there is a cost involved in waiting.
While we do not model resale explicitly in our model, it is realistic to allow the goods to
have a residual resale for sellers, because a seller would not want to sell her good now if
the maximum offer received would be less than what she could get by waiting to sell in a
future auction.
In order to model this formally, we allow sellers of each good Gt to set a hidden reserve
value bt,res, not visible to the bidders before the auction starts. The way such a model with
hidden reserves works is that, after all the bids have been received, a seller can keep the
10Note that, while in this paper, for simplicity, we consider direct, not reverse auctions in which the lowest bid
wins, the exposure problem over bundles of orders is identical.
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(b∗
1,...,b∗
n) maximize equation 3:
  B∗ = argmax  B∗ E(πdir
syn) (4)
Note that, with a decision theoretic model, the synergy bidder takes into account the
reservation values bt,res as part of the expectation probability F(bt) (recall that F(bt) is
deﬁned as the probability of winning by placing bid bt).
2.4 Seller’s expected proﬁt and strategy assumptions
Next, the proﬁt of the sellers are examined. We assume that all sellers have their own
valuation for the good that they sell and that they set their reserve price of bt,res equal to
this private valuation. So when the good is sold for bt, the seller of Gt has a proﬁt πdir
t of
bt − bt,res. As previously shown, the synergy buyer participates only when she has won
the previous auctions; otherwise bmt is the maximal placed bid (or, if bmt = bt,res, the
seller keeps the item).
Additionally, we also need an assumption on the seller’s patience, because when an
option is sold to a synergy buyer, that buyer must be able to decide whether to exercise
it or not after all the other auctions of interest ﬁnish. To avoid such timing issues, in our
model we explicitly assume that the n auctions that a synergy buyer can participate in are
conducted by sellers with longer deadlines than the buyers.
Given the above modeling assumptions, the expected proﬁt of the seller of the good Gt
sold at time t can be written as:
E(πdir






+ (1 − Ft(bt))(E(bmt|bmt ≥ bt) − bt,res)
  t−1  
i=1
Fi(bi) (5)
Intuitively explained, the equation deﬁnes the expected utility over 3 disjoint cases: one
in which the optimal bids bi of the synergy bidder were not sufﬁcient to win all auctions up
to time t, in which case the expected proﬁt of the seller is the highest expected bid of the
local bidders, captured by E(bmt), minus its own reservation value bt,res (or, in the case
bmt = bt,res, possible according to Equation 1, this term becomes zero); the second case
in which the synergy bidder wins all previous auctions, including the current one (i.e. the
one at time t), in which case the expected proﬁt is this bid minus reservation bt−bt,res, and
the third in which the synergy buyer won all previous auctions but fails to win the current
one, in which case still the highest bid by the local bidders is taken.
2.5 Synergy buyer and seller proﬁts in a model with options
Previous sections derived the expected proﬁt functions for the synergy buyer and the sellers
in a market without options. The next step is to do the same for a market with options. This
section has the same setting as the general model with n goods being sold, only now an
option on Gt is auctioned at time t. Therefore, all the sellers in the market will sell options
for their goods, instead of directly the goods themselves. After the n auctions have taken
place, the buyers need to determine whether or not they will exercise their option. It is
assumed that an option is exercised only if a buyer has obtained her entire, desired bundle.
The local bidders are only interested in Gt, so they will always exercise an option on Gt
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should they have one. The synergy buyer is only interested in a bundle of all goods, so she
will only exercise an option (and pay the corresponding exercise price) if she has options
on all the goods required.
The option consists of a ﬁxed exercise price Kt and the synergy buyer’s bids on the
option price are   OP = (op1,...,opn). The maximal bid without the synergy buyer was
bmt, but now opmt is the maximal placed option price.
Recall that we assume that the competition is formed by local bidders, who cannot rea-
son about the presence in the market or the bids placed by the synergy buyer. Moreover,
all local bidders in an auction only want the one good sold in that auction, hence they do
not beneﬁt from having an option and they will always exercise any option they acquire.
Because of these assumptions, it follows that the competition will keep bidding the same
total price, which is the bid without options minus the exercise price. Thus the distribution
of the competition is only shifted horizontally to the left, by the reduction of the exercise
price: opmt = bmt − Kt (since the seller can set Kt ≤ bt,res, this ensures that always
bmt ≥ Kt, c.f. Equation 1). Thus, if the synergy buyer bids the same total price (option +
exercise), then she has the same probability of winning the auction in both models.
Let Fo
t (opt) be the probability that opt wins the auction for the option on Gt. So if
opt + Kt = bt, then Fo
t (opt) = Fo
t (bt − Kt) = Ft(bt).


























n) maximize the proﬁt equation 6:
  OP
∗
= argmax   OP
∗ E(πop
syn) (7)
The main difference for the seller of Gt, is that if the synergy buyer wins, then she earns
opt immediately when the options is sold, and an additional Kt − bt,res when (and if) the
option is exercised. The probability of exercise is the probability that the synergy buyer
wins all the subsequent auctions. As in the model without options, the seller of good Gt
can set a hidden reservation value for her good bt,res. As before, this represents a potential
resale value for her, in case the item remains unsold, or in case the option for the item is
sold, but it is not exercised. Basically, the way the mechanism works is that each seller
announces the exercise price level of Kt, and receives a number of option price bids. After
all these option price bids are received, the seller has the option to cancel the auction and
keep the good if the maximal bid received falls under bt,res − Kt.
Given this model, the total expected proﬁt of the seller of good Gt sold at time t is:
E(π
op
















+ (1 − Fo
t (opt))(E(opmt|opmt ≥ opt) + Kt − bt,res)
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with respect to the benchmark strategy with options, i.e. op′











































We can now replace op′
t with the deﬁnition of the benchmark strategy (i.e. same total
bid amount, as in the case without options), using the properties: op′
t = b∗
t − Kt and
Fo
t (op′
t + λt) = Ft(b∗
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To explain intuitively Lemma 3.4, the difference in expected proﬁts between the two
models is formed of 4 parts (corresponding to the 4 lines). First, in an options model, the
synergy bidder has a higher probability of getting the desired bundle and extract its value,
since she bids more in total (line 1). Furthermore, in an options model, the bidder does
not have to pay exercise prices unless she acquires all n items in the desired bundle (line
2). On the minus side, she does have to pay a set of additional amounts λ (line 3) for all
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In order to determine the optimal value op∗
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+ uao = 2op∗
1
We now focus our attention at computing the difference λ∗ between the optima decision-
theoretic bid in a model with options vs. a model without options. By deﬁnition, we have
that: λ∗ = (K1 + op∗
1) − b∗
1, so 2λ∗ = 2op∗
1 + 2K1 − 2b∗
1. When taking this difference,
uao = ua − K1 and opk are replaced according to opk = op′
k = b∗
t − Kt (because for the
other auctions, the benchmark strategy is used) and Fo
k(op′
k) = F1(b∗
1). Then all variables
cancel each other out, except for the Kt:
2(b∗









































































































































This polynomial equation can then be solved via the quadratic formula:
λl = −(b∗
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Note that, formally, the condition ua ≤ b∗ ≤ ub should also be imposed in the above
equation. However, if b∗ for the direct sale case falls outside this interval (i.e. if ≤
E(πdir
syn,k≥2) < ua or ≤ E(πdir
syn,k≥2) > ub + (ub − ua)), we know that the the lambda
of the seller λ∗ = 0, so there is no point in the seller even considering offering options.
Outside this interval, it makes no sense to compute an expression for λl.
The next and ﬁnal step involves comparing the equations for λ∗ (from Lemma 3.8) and
λl (from Lemma 3.9), such as to derive a condition for when λl < λ∗. We found that
getting a closed form expression for this condition is not possible for these two equations.
However, the framework developed above is sufﬁcient to enable the seller to solve this
condition numerically using a standard solver and, thus, choose the optimal level for the
exercise price K1.
Note that all the analysis performed in this section (and, overall, in this paper) refers
to using options when [at least] one of the buyers participating in the sequential auction
market is a synergy buyer (and, thus, she has an exposure problem, as deﬁned in the in-
troduction). All the optimal price bounds for options given here refer to the case when
options serve to relieve this exposure problem of a buyer with complementarities.
It is conceivable, however, that options might also prove useful in cases when agents
do not have synergy valuations. For example, options could also be used in the case of
substitutabilities (i.e. when agents have to choose between a set of items sold in sequence).
However, the complementarity problem is arguably the hardest to address, and this is why
we focus on it here, leaving the study of the usefulness of options in other cases to future
work.
3.3 Numerical illustration of option pricing
In this section, before we provide the full experimental analysis of the model, we provide
some details of the optimal pricing window (i.e. the interval for which op′ + λl ≤ op′ +
λ∗ ≤ op′ + λh). To this end, we use a conﬁguration similar to the settings used in the
experiments reported in Section 4.
We consider a basic setting with n = 2 auctions, and a synergy bidder wanting both
items. Her valuation for getting both of these items is vsyn. Now, in each of the 2 auctions
the bidder faces a number of local bidders only interested in acquiring the item in that
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A basic simulation run is as follows. First, all possible auction sequences are determined
for the given number of auctions for A and B. The simulation is then run for all these
sequences, both for a direct sale setting and for a setting where the items are sold through
options with given exercise prices.
For each auction, in each simulation run, there is a set of local bidders, who are assumed
not to reason about the bids of the synergy buyer. The bids of these local bidders are
therefore, assumed to follow a normal price distribution, with the parameters n,mean,std
and res consisting out of two values: one for good A and one for good B. For each sim-
ulation run, the synergy bidders(s) are asked to determine their proﬁt-maximizing bid for
that setting, as described in the next section. The optimization required for determining
their optimal bid is done using the Matlab function “fminsearch” from the Optimization
Toolbox.
Since there may be considerable variance in the bids of the local bidders each possible
auction sequence is run k times (typically, we had k > 10000). The average proﬁt of the
seller and the synergy buyer which are reported here, for both the case of with and without
options, are averages over all these k simulations and also over all possible auction orders
of items A and B in the sequence.
4.1 Synergy buyer’s bid strategy
This section describes how the synergy buyer determines her bids in the simulation. In
order to neutralize the effect that the exact order items are auctioned in plays on the bidding
strategy, we add the assumption that the synergy buyer knows the number of remaining
auctions, but not the order they will be held in. This remaining number of auctions of
each type is common knowledge (i.e. the synergy bidders can always observe how many
auctions of each type are left before they have to leave the market, and so does the seller).
The model described here is for a situation without options. But in order to apply it
to a situation with options, one merely has to replace the variables: bt = opt − Kt and
vsyn(A,B) := vsyn(A,B) − KA − KB. As in the analytical section, we assume a bidder
wants only a complete bundle of {A,B}. Therefore, vsyn(A) = 0, vsyn(B) = 0.
Determining the synergy buyer’s proﬁt-maximizing bid b∗
t at state t basically involves
solving the Markov Decision Process (MDP), where we select the optimal bid b∗
t at time
t, subject to the optimal bid b∗
t+1 being selected for the future time point t + 1 (which in
this case, is an auction). We can, however, use the valuation function of the bidding agent
to signiﬁcantly reduce the state space of the MDP, as shown below. However, ﬁrst we
introduce some notation.
Let b∗ be the immediate best response to the state, which depends on four variables:
zA,zB,X and It. The variables zA and zB are the number of remaining auctions for A
and B respectively (including the current auction), so zA ≤ nA, zB ≤ nB. The type
of good, which is currently sold, is denoted by It. The set of goods the synergy buyer
owns (i.e. the endowment) is described by X, which can either be ∅,{A} or {B}. If X is
{A,B} then the synergy buyer is done14. Let Q(zA,zB,X,It,bt) be the expected proﬁt of
14Note that the experimental settings used in the model considered here preclude the possibility of the synergy
buyer from acquiring more options than she needs to make up her desired bundle. But it is theoretically possible
in our model, especially in settings with very low option prices compared to the synergy valuations, that the
synergy buyer is incentivised to hoard options for more items than she really needs, and only choose to exercise
some of these in the end. We leave the examination of such cases to further work.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, August 2012.· 29
the synergy buyer when bidding bt. Note that, in these deﬁnitions, b∗
t+1 and Vt+1() denote
the best available bid, respectively best expected value for the next state (as computed by
recursion), while It+1 is the type of the next item in the auction sequence. Therefore, using
MDP notation, the proﬁt-maximizing bid b∗
t is determined as follows:
b∗
t = argmaxbt Q(zA,zB,X,It,bt) (12)
Where the expected proﬁt is determined via:
Q(zA,zB,X,It = A,b∗
t+1) = FA(bt)(−bt
+ Vt+1(zA − 1,zB,X ∪ A,b∗
t+1)) + (1 − FA(bt))Vt+1(zA − 1,zB,X,b∗
t+1) (13)
Q(zA,zB,X,It = B,bt) = FB(bt)(−bt
+ Vt+1(zA,zB − 1,X ∪ B,b∗
t+1)) + (1 − FB(bt))Vt+1(zA,zB − 1,X,b∗
t+1) (14)
Where V () is the value of a state, which simply means the maximum expected proﬁt of
that state:
Vt(zA,zB,X,bt) = maxbt Q(zA,zB,X,It,bt) (15)
Looking at the formula for Q(), it basically says that for the probability of winning the
auction with her bid, the synergy buyer has to pay a price equal to her bid and the good is
included in the endowment X of the next state. If she does not win the auction, then the
value of the current state is equal to the value of the next state.
As we mentioned before, in computing its optimal bidding strategy used in the experi-
mental section, we assume the synergy buyer does not know whether the next auction will
be for A or B, she knows only the total numbers of auctions for A and B remaining. We
acknowledge this is a departure from the formulas in the theoretical analysis, where the
exact order of the auctions was taken into account to compute the bidding strategies. There
are two reasons to use this assumption here. The ﬁrst is that it reduces considerable the
state space that needs to be modeled when computed the optimization. But the second is
that we also ﬁnd this choice more realistic if this model is to be applied to real-life settings.
For example, when bidding on a part-truck order in a logistic scenario, it is more realistic
to assume that a carrier can approximate the number of future opportunities to buy a com-
plementary load, but not the exact auction order in which future loads will be offered for
auction.
If we assume the synergy buyer only knows the total numbers of auctions for A and B
remaining (and not their exact order), then her bidding strategy is based on assuming each
future auction has an equal probability to occur. Therefore, the probability of an auction
for A occurring next is simply the number of remaining auctions A divided by the total
number of remaining auctions. Thus, a weighted average can be used to determine the
value of the next auction, while not knowing for which good it will be for.
Apart from this general framework, we can prune the state space with the cases in which
we know the synergy buyer’s bid is zero:
b∗
t = argmaxbt Q(0,zB,X,B,bt) = 0, with A / ∈ X (16)
b∗
t = argmaxbt Q(zA,0,X,A,bt) = 0, with B / ∈ X (17)
bt∗ = argmaxbt Q(zA,zB,X,It ∈ X,bt) = 0 (18)
With the ﬁrst two cases, the synergy buyer can no longer obtain her desired bundle,
because she does not own the complementary item and there is no chance left of acquiring
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it. The last equation is for the case when the synergy buyer already has a copy of the type
of good (and, from her valuation function, she only wants exactly one copy of A and B).
The corresponding values of these states are:
V (0,zB,X,b∗
t) = 0, if A / ∈ X (19)
V (zA,0,X,b∗
t) = 0, if B / ∈ X (20)
V (zA,zB,{A},b∗
t) = V (0,zB,{A},b∗
t) (21)
V (zA,zB,{B},b∗
t) = V (zA,0,{B},b∗
t) (22)
The ﬁrst two equations correspond to the case when the buyer can no longer get the
complementary-valued item, therefore the sequence of auctions of the same type has no
value to her. In both these cases b∗
t = 0. The last two equations are important, since they
help the most to reduce the state space. Basically, as already mentioned, we assume that
a synergy bidder only wants exactly one bundle of {A,B}. If she already owns a good
of one of the two types, she will no longer be interested in the remaining auctions for that
type of good. Therefore, the valuation V () of these states is equivalent to a state when no
auctions are remaining for the type of good she already owns (as she would not take part
in those anyway). All these techniques help reduce the recursive search.
To conclude, to determine the synergy buyer’s bids in any situation, the values of b∗
t and
V () need to be calculated for the following states:
∀zB > 0 Q(0,zB,{A},B,bt)
∀zA > 0 Q(zA,0,{B},A,bt)
∀zA > 0,zB > 0 Q(zA,zB,∅,A,bt)
∀zA > 0,zB > 0 Q(zA,zB,∅,B,bt)
Note that, in general, solving for b∗
t involves solving a continuous MDP - except for
some cases for which a closed form solution exists (e.g. the case of uniform distributions in
Section 3.2). Basically, in the setting considered here with small sequences of auctions, we
can treat solving for the optimal bids as a multi-variable optimization problem, which can
be solved with standard optimization packages available in Matlab. In larger settings with
more auctions, computing the solutions of this MDP may be considerably more involved,
and may require additional computational techniques that have not been studied as part of
this paper. We note, however, that solving continuous MDPs efﬁciently, while not trivial,
is an active research area, and we provide sufﬁcient details that the solutions developed
there could be applied to our framework.
4.2 Experimental results: market entry effect for one synergy buyer
First, we study experimentally the incentives to use options for the sellers and buyers, in
the case there is just one synergy bidder present in the market. In order to study different
dimensions of such markets, we considered several combinations of parameter settings.
TheﬁrstsettinghasnA = 2andnB = 2. Asmentioned above, thelocalbiddersonlybid
in one local auction, without considering the bids placed by the synergy bidder. Therefore,
their bids can be modeled as a distribution ∼ N(10,4) for both goods. The goods A and B
are, in this model, of equal rarity and attract an equal amount of independent competition
during bidding. This choice is not random, as having a certain degree of symmetry in
the experimental model allows us to reduce the number of parameter settings we need to
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consider. More speciﬁcally, we assume the same exercise prices are set for both goods of
type A and B. This is a reasonable assumption, because A and B are of symmetric value
and because bidders do not know in advance the exact order goods will be sold in.
Furthermore, for each good, the seller has a reservation value res = 8, which gives its
estimate resell value in the case the synergy buyer acquires an option for the item, but fails
to exercise it. Since, on average, local bidders bid have an expected mean of 10 for an item,
20% is a reasonably safe estimate of a resell value.
The value of a bundle of {A,B} for the synergy buyer is an important choice, especially
in relation to the mean expectation   of the bids placed by single-item bidders. We con-
sidered two settings: v(A,B) = 24 (thus 20% more, on average, than local competition) -
with results shown in Fig. 3, and v(A,B) = 21 (which is only 5% more on average than
local competition) - with results shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. Percentage increase in proﬁt for a model using options with respect to direct sale, for the case there is one
synergy buyer is present in the market. In the setting, there are two items of type A sold and two items of type B.
For all 4 items, the bids of the local bidders follow the distribution N(10,4), while the valuation of the synergy
buyer is v(A,B) = 24 (thus 20% more, on average, than the local bidders). What is varied on the horizontal axis
is the exercise price with which the items are sold (assuming they are set the same for all items, being of equal
rarity). Note that the ﬁgure is super-imposed: the left-hand side axis refers exclusively to the seller, while the
right-hand side axis refers exclusively to the synergy bidder. From this picture, one can already see the important
effect: synergy buyer prefers, on average, higher exercise prices, while seller prefers lower ones. Note that there
is a sudden increase in proﬁt, on the seller side, for the options case with k = ǫ > 0, with respect to direct
auctioning. This is simply because, with options, the seller gets to keep the item (for which it has a non-residual
value), rather than the buyer, who disposes of it (as in the direct sale case).
Looking at these two ﬁgures, some important effect can be observed. First, we mention
that the seller has an immediately higher expected proﬁt with options compared to direct
sale. This is because an option is sometimes not exercised and then the seller gets to keep
the good (for which she has a positive valuation), while the synergy buyer still pays the
option price.
There are two main effects to be observed from Fig. 3 and 4:
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Fig. 4. Percentage increase in proﬁt for a model using options with respect to direct sale, for the case there is one
synergy buyer is present in the market. The settings are exactly the same as those is in Fig. 3 above: 2 auctions
for A and 2 for B, with local bidders following N(10,4). However, now the valuation of the synergy buyer is
v(A,B) = 21 (thus only 5% more, on average, than the local bidders). One can see, however, that there is an
important difference by comparison to Fig. 3: the threshold effect in the proﬁt increase for the seller when the
exercise price K ≥ 2.5. Intuitively, the reason this effect occurs is the market-entry effect on the part of the
synergy buyer, who would otherwise stay out for this lower valuation
Fig. 5. Percentage increase in proﬁt for the case of one synergy buyer, for longer auction sequences. The
settings in terms of valuations are exactly the same as those is in Fig. 4 above: the synergy buyer has a value
v(A,B) = 21, while single-item bidders bid according to N(10,4). One change is that now there are 4 auctions
available for each type, i.e. 4 auctions for an item of type A and 4 for B. Notice that now there are multiple
thresholds, since there are multiple points when the market entry effect of the synergy buyers appears. However,
on average, the percentage increases in expected proﬁts for the synergy buyers are lower, when compared to the
direct auctions case. The reason for this is that, with multiple future buying opportunities, the exposure problems
that synergy bidder faces decreases.
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expected proﬁt, she has the incentive to leave the market altogether. There are two main
factors that increase a synergy buyer’s expected proﬁt in a sequence of auctions (sold as
options):
—The number of remaining future auctions of the other good, necessary to complete her
bundle.
—The exercise price of the options (that only needs to be paid at the end). This should be
high enough to cover the risk, given her valuation for the bundle.
Note that in some market setting (such as the one in Fig. 3), no participation effects
(i.e. thresholds) occur, because the value the synergy buyer assigns to her desired bundle
is already high enough, so she would participate in the market anyway (i.e. regardless of
whether she gets offered options or not), and at any point in the sequence that there is still
a chance of completing her bundle.
However, in the valuation settings in Fig. 4, the synergy buyer will only bid on a good
if there are two remaining auctions for the other good. So she places a bid for A if the
auctions are [A,B,B], but not if they are [A,B]. This is because with a single auction for
B, the risk of ending up with only a worthless A is too great. But in a market with exercise
prices of at least 2.5, the risk is reduced and one remaining auction is already enough for
the synergy buyer to stay in the market. So a higher exercise price enables the synergy
buyer to stay the market, even if she owns nothing and there are only a few auctions left,
which increases the seller’s expected proﬁt. This increase in participation is beneﬁcial to
the seller, who thus has an incentive to ﬁx the exercise prices KA = KB = 2.5.
4.3 Settings with longer sequences of auctions and effect of auction order
In the previous section, we examined a sequence of auctions of a speciﬁc length of nA =
2,nB = 2. We now look at whether we can observe similar effects in the case when the
number of opportunities to buy goods A and B increases. With the exception of auction
lengths, the parameters are kept the same as in the previous case. First, we keep the relative
rarity of both goods symmetrical, but increase the number of auctions available for each to
4, i.e. nA = nB = 4. Results are shown in Fig. 5.
Basically, there are two main effects to observe here. First, the beneﬁts to the buyer
of having options mechanism decreases (seen from comparing the percentage increases
shown in the right-hand vertical axis of Figs. 4 and 5). The reason for this is that, in
sequential auctions, the number of available future opportunities plays a big role in how
big the exposure problem the synergy buyer faces is. If there is less exposure, then the
relative beneﬁts of using options becomes smaller (although it is still quite considerable).
The second effect to be observed from Fig. 5 is that there are more participation thresholds
(denoted by peaks), but they are smaller. The reason is that, for a longer sequence of auc-
tions, there are more possible sequences of remaining auction combinations. The synergy
bidder will join in the bidding in some, but not in others, leading to multiple participation
thresholds.
The second problem we look in this subsection at is what happens if the relative fre-
quency of the two goods is more asymmetric. We keep the same total number of auctions
in the sequence (8), but the relative frequency is highly asymmetric: nA = 1,nB = 7. As
mentioned, in the previous graphs, results were averaged over all possible auction orders -
while here, by contrast, we look at auction orders one by one.
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For this setting, there are exactly 8 possible auction orders, corresponding to the point
where the rarer good (type A) can be inserted in the auction queue. What is varied on the
horizontal axis is this position of the type A good. The reason why we look at whether a
seller of items of type B would use options is that the exposure of the synergy buyer exists
for the other good in the sequence. For the single item of type A, the beneﬁts of using
options are limited, because the synergy buyer has 7 other auctions in which to acquire the
second item anyway, hence she has much less of an exposure problem.
Clearly, we can see an important effect of the position of the rarer good in the auction
queue, from the perspective of both parties. If the item of type A is sold at the very
beginning of the auction sequence, then the synergy bidder has no exposure problem left
for the rest of the sequence, hence there is no incentive to use options, for either party.
However, it is at the very end of the auction sequence, the synergy buyer will not know
whether she would need the item acquired until all auctions end. For this case, the beneﬁts
of using options are considerably greater.
5. MULTIPLE SYNERGY BUYERS
Finally, we consider market settings in which multiple synergy buyers are active simulta-
neously. Much of the experimental set-up and parameter choices are the same as described
in the above sections, for the case of one for the single synergy buyer. The only difference
is that now multiple synergy buyers may enter and leave the market at different times and
they have different valuations for the combination of A and B.
Wehavetoemphasizethattheresultsfromthissectionarestillratherpreliminaryandare
based on some restrictions on the reasoning capability of the synergy buyers in the market.
Speciﬁcally, as in the single-bidder case, we assume the synergy bidders have some prior
expectations about the closing prices in future auctions and compute their optimal strategy
withrespecttothisexpectation. Intheseresults, thisexpectationisassumedthesameforall
synergy bidders, which is a reasonable choice in comparing their strategies, but assuming
the sequence of auctions considered is too short for other synergy buyers to learn about
existing competition and adapt their bids. In a more realistic market, however, synergy
bidders could be expected to be able to learn and adjust their expectations based on past
interactions, as well as reason game-theoretically about the fact that another synergy bidder
may present in the market at the same time. At this point, these more sophisticated forms
of reasoning are left to future work.
As in the previous section all simulations of this section have reserve prices of 8 and
local bidders following ∼ N(10,2.5). The ﬁrst two experiments also have two synergy
buyers syn1 and syn2 with valuations for both goods of 21.5 and 22.5 respectively. The
order the synergy bidders enter the market (and the number of auctions they can stay in)
are given in Figs. 9 and 10, while results for all settings are shown in Fig. 7, respectively
8. In the following, we will discuss these in separate subsections.
5.1 Two synergy buyers interacting indirectly through the exercise price level
In the setting examined here, the two synergy buyers each have nA = 3 and nB = 3,
without the other agent participating in these auctions. An example of such an auction
sequence is shown in Fig. 9. However, these two synergy bidders do interact indirectly as
follows. Since options are sold through open auctions based on the option price, the seller
has to ﬁx the exercise prices for the whole market (i.e. for all auctions in the sequence).
So while synergy buyers may not participate in the same auctions, their presence does
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Fig. 9. An auction sequence for the case shown in Fig 7.
seller’s choice of exercise prices, one synergy buyer (syn1) gains, while syn2 loses.
5.2 Direct synergy buyer competition in the same market
Next, we considered a setting in which synergy buyers compete directly for some of the
goods. The entry points for such a setting are shown in Fig. 10, while simulation results
are given in Fig. 8.
Fig. 10. An auction sequence for the case shown in Fig. 8.
As can be seen in Figure 8, the proﬁt of syn2 drops at 2.5. In previous ﬁgures the
synergy buyers’ proﬁts were monotonically increasing in the exercise prices, because they
then have a smaller loss when they fail to complete their bundle. But now this effect cannot
immediately compensate the extra competition coming from syn1, who participates in the
same auctions more often after this threshold at 2.5. So, in this case, both synergy buyers
lose from the presence of additional bidders. While one synergy buyer (i.e. syn2) should
beneﬁt because she is offered better (higher) exercise prices than if she were alone in the
market, this effect cannot immediately compensate the additional competition.
5.3 Larger simulation with random synergy buyers’ market entry
In the ﬁnal results we report in this paper, we conducted a larger scale simulation with
multiple synergy buyers, which can enter the market randomly, with a certain probability.
The experimental setup implies that each sequence of auctions (forming a test case)
has 10 items of each type (i.e. nA = 10 and nB = 10). What differs from previous
settings is the random entry of synergy buyers. For each auction, there is a 25% chance
that a synergy buyer will enter the market. If she does, then her valuation is drawn from
a uniform distribution between 20 and 22 and she will stay in the market for exactly four
auctions. To simplify matters, the auction sequence is ﬁxed at ﬁrst selling A, then B, then
A etc. so that each synergy buyer will face exactly two auctions for an item of type A
and two for an item of type B. However, the general result of this section is also true for a
random auction sequence, since the basic effects remain the same.
As shown in Figure 11, the seller’s proﬁt now only has one maximum at 5, because
initially each increase in exercise prices causes, with some probability, a synergy buyer
to participate more often. So each point is a threshold and the proﬁt graph smooths out
over those many local maxima, corresponding to a steady increase (on average) of the
expected proﬁt. This result shows why it can be rational for the seller to have the same
exercise prices for all goods of the same type (e.g. the same KA). In a market with random
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